The Real Cost of a Rs 700 Shirt — a Seerat Fatima Investigation | TrendCompare.pk

TrendCompare Research · Investigation

The Real Cost of a Rs 700 Shirt

SF

By Seerat Fatima

Founder & Editor, TrendCompare.pk · Published 17 August 2026

Mountains of unwanted clothes really did appear in a Chilean desert. Rivers really do run the colour of this season's trend. But almost every article you have read about it repeats statistics that fall apart the moment you check them. Over three weeks I had every one of them traced back to its source. Most did not survive — and the ones that did point somewhere nobody expects: at us.

I run a price-comparison site, not an environmental NGO. I started this because a reader asked me a question I could not answer: if a shirt costs Rs 700, who paid the difference? Answering it honestly meant checking the famous numbers rather than repeating them. This page publishes what survived — and, in its own section, exactly what did not and why.

Every global figure below carries its source and the year of the underlying data — because most of the famous numbers in this field describe 2015. Pakistani figures come live from TrendCompare's own tracker of 22 brands. 36 sources are listed in full at the end.

What Rs 700 actually buys

Right now our tracker holds 21,247 in-stock items priced under Rs 1,000 across 22 Pakistani brands. Their median price is Rs 699. The cheapest T-shirt on any of those 22 sites today costs Rs 290.

21,247

In-stock items under Rs 1,000

Rs 699

Median price of those items

Rs 290

Cheapest T-shirt across 22 brands

176,144

In-stock items tracked

Start with the number on the tag, because that is the only part of the cost anyone sees.

A shirt at that price has to cover cotton, spinning, weaving, dyeing, cutting, stitching, finishing, packing, freight, the retailer's margin, and the discount it will eventually be sold at. Something in that chain is absorbing the difference. The rest of this page is about what, and who.

The desert full of clothes — and what actually happened to it

In Chile's Atacama, near Alto Hospicio, a pile of discarded clothing grew from around 2001 until it covered dozens of acres and was visible from satellites. The clothes came from Europe, the United States, Korea and Japan. It became the defining image of fashion waste.

Two things about it are almost never reported correctly. First, the pile burned — a fire on 12 June 2022 consumed more than half of it by the next morning — and by January 2023 the visible dump was gone, bulldozed away, leaving ash and tyre tracks. Around 200 smaller dumps have appeared since, and the burning continues. Articles written in the present tense about “the mountain of clothes in the Atacama” are describing something cleared more than three years ago.

Second, nobody ever weighed it. Estimates ranged from 11,000 to 59,000 tonnes — a spread wide enough to be an admission. Chile's own government states it has no inventory of illegal textile dumps and no concrete figure for how much is discarded this way.

The mechanism, though, is documented — and it is the part that matters. Iquique's tax-free Zofri zone lets importers receive bales of used clothing uninspected; merchants buy, as one put it, with their eyes closed. Because the bales are so cheap, a merchant needs to sell only about 40% of one to profit. Roughly 85% of imported used clothing goes unsold. The desert was not a destination anyone chose. It was the arithmetic.

The waste, in numbers that survive checking

Of all the fibre made into clothing, 73% is landfilled or incinerated at the end of its life, and under 1% is recycled back into new clothing. Another 12% is downcycled into insulation, wiping cloths and mattress stuffing — useful, but a one-way trip. Those proportions describe 2015 and remain the most-cited breakdown in the field.

Nine years later the recycling picture has barely moved. Global fibre production reached 132 million tonnes in 2024, projected to hit about 169 million by 2030. Recycled fibres are 7.6% of that — but almost all of it is polyester made from plastic bottles, not from clothes. Textile-to-textile recycling is still below 1%. Polyester alone is 59% of everything produced, and 88% of that polyester is fossil-based.

In the European Union, textile consumption rose from 17 kg per person in 2019 to 19 kg in 2022. EU textile waste reached 6.94 million tonnes, of which just under 15% is collected separately. And between 4% and 9% of all textiles placed on the EU market are destroyed before anyone wears them.

Pakistan is not a bystander. It is the world's largest destination.

In 2024 Pakistan imported 1.08 million tonnes of used clothing, worth US$478 million — the single largest importer of second-hand clothing on earth, importing more by value than the entire European Union (US$237m), and more than double Kenya or Guatemala.

This is the part of the story told about Chile and Ghana and almost never about here. The landa bazaar most Pakistani families have shopped at is the retail end of the largest second-hand clothing flow in the world, and the biggest single supplier into it is the United States — 550 million kilogrammes in 2024, roughly half the import value.

Much of this is genuinely good. Reuse is the best thing that can happen to a garment, and landa clothes millions of people at prices no retailer can match. But the European Environment Agency, describing where used textiles go once they leave Europe, is blunt: shipments reaching Asia are sorted, and what is not resold is largely downcycled into industrial rags and filling, with the residue likely landfilled. It adds that the public perception of donated clothing as a gift to people in need “does not fully match reality.”

Two honest limits. The EEA describes EU exports to Asia generally, not Pakistan specifically — and the EU supplies only a minority of what arrives here. And we could not verify what share of Pakistan's imports goes unsold, or where the unsold portion ends up. No published figure survived checking. That gap is itself the finding: Chile's dumps were photographed from space before anyone thought to weigh them, and here a million tonnes a year arrives with nobody counting what happens next.

And the cotton is running out

There is a second Pakistani story inside this one. Textiles are roughly 60% of everything Pakistan exports — US$17.93 billion in FY2025-26, a figure that grew just 0.26% on the year. That industry is built on cotton, and the cotton is disappearing.

Pakistan produced 14.6 million bales in 2004-05. The 2023-24 crop was 4.91 million — the lowest in nearly four decades outside the flood year — and recent seasons have run between 5.6 and 7.1 million depending on which official series you use. That is a fall of roughly two-thirds from the peak. The country is now projected to import 7 to 7.5 million bales in a year, worth up to US$1.2 billion — meaning Pakistan expects to import more cotton than it grows. Nearly half its ginning factories have already shut.

Put the two facts side by side and the shape is hard to miss. The country whose economy rests on making cloth is importing the raw material to make it — and importing the world's largest volume of other countries' discarded clothes at the same time.

#1

Pakistan's world rank, used-clothing imports (2024)

1.08 Mt

Tonnes imported in 2024

$478m

Import value, 2024

550m kg

From the United States alone

The people who make it — including here

Wages are between 0.5% and 5% of a garment's retail price, usually under 3%. That ratio is calculated for export garments sold in Europe and North America, so do not map it straight onto the Rs 700 tag. But it explains why clothing prices fell for thirty years while the wage bill barely moved: labour was never the expensive part, so squeezing it never made clothes much cheaper. It just made them cheaper for someone.

Here is the arithmetic that does apply locally. Pakistan's federal minimum wage rose to Rs 40,700 a month from 1 July 2026 — roughly Rs 1,565 for a working day on a 26-day month. A Rs 700 shirt is close to half a day of legally minimum work. And the Asia Floor Wage Alliance estimates a living wage in Pakistan at around Rs 103,772 a month, putting the legal minimum at about 39% of it.

The legal minimum is also, for many, theoretical. Labour research organisation PILER estimated in 2023 that around 80% of unskilled workers in Pakistan do not receive the legal minimum wage. No authoritative national compliance figure has been published since — itself worth noticing. Note too that since the 18th Amendment there is no single binding national minimum: the federal figure binds only Islamabad, and each province notifies its own. Sindh set Rs 43,000 from 1 July 2026.

Baldia, 11 September 2012

Pakistan does not need to import this story. At the Ali Enterprises garment factory in Baldia Town, Karachi, a fire killed more than 250 workers — court records put the toll above 260. The windows were barred. Exit doors were locked. There was one working fire exit. A survivor's account of the managers: “They prevented people from leaving, so they could save the clothes.”

Three weeks before the fire, an Italian certification body had audited the factory and certified it compliant with the SA8000 social-accountability standard — missing the absence of a working fire alarm and of adequate emergency exits. German retailer KiK, the main buyer, paid US$1 million in emergency relief and later US$5.15 million in long-term compensation brokered by the ILO — six years after the fire, and voluntarily rather than as a legal award. A German court case brought by a survivor and three families was dismissed in January 2019 as time-barred, decided on procedure and never on the merits.

Status as of August 2026 — why most accounts are now out of date

A 2015 investigation concluded the fire was arson over an extortion demand, and in 2020 an anti-terrorism court convicted two men on that basis. On 10 June 2026 the Supreme Court of Pakistan acquitted both, holding the 2015 investigation report inadmissible as evidence. The Sindh government's review petition is pending. The cause of the fire is once again formally unresolved. What the Supreme Court's own judgment did point to was structural negligence by the factory ownership — locked gates, barred windows, inadequate exits. That part has never been in dispute.

Something did change afterwards. The Pakistan Accord — a binding safety agreement between international brands and unions, with independent inspection — came into effect on 1 January 2023 and was renewed from January 2026. As of 30 June 2026 it covers 454 factories and 523,695 workers in Sindh and Punjab. What makes it different from ordinary corporate auditing is that it is enforceable: under its Bangladesh predecessor, unions took brands to arbitration at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, and the brands paid over US$2.3 million toward repairs.

For scale, the disaster that created that model: Rana Plaza in Bangladesh, 24 April 2013, killed at least 1,134 people — the ILO and the Accord put it at 1,138 — and injured around 2,600. The $30 million compensation fund did not reach its target until June 2015. The criminal trial still has no verdict, thirteen years on.

One last figure, because it shows how a wage can fall while the number on it stays still. Bangladesh set its garment minimum wage at Tk 12,500 a month in December 2023, worth about US$113 then. The taka figure has not changed since. At August 2026 rates it is worth about US$102 — roughly 10% less, without anyone announcing a cut. Workers had asked for Tk 23,000.

Carbon: the number everyone gets wrong

You will have read that fashion produces 10% of global carbon emissions. It does not, and no study says it does. That figure appears to be a transcription error that escaped into general circulation and never came back.

What the research shows is a range of about 2% to 8%, and the range exists because three studies used three methods — 2% (WRI and the Apparel Impact Institute, 2021), 4% (McKinsey and Global Fashion Agenda, 2020) and 8% (Quantis, 2018). That is methodological disagreement, not uncertainty around a known value.

The most recent bottom-up estimate is the one worth quoting. In July 2025 the Apparel Impact Institute put apparel emissions at 0.944 billion tonnes CO₂e for 2023 — about 1.8% of global emissions, and a 7.5% rise on 2022. The largest single source is not farming or shipping but textile processing, at 55%. The Institute attributes the increase chiefly to growing polyester use, and states it assumes the rise of ultra-fast-fashion brands is a key contributor.

1.8% is a smaller number than the one you have been told. It is also rising while nearly every other sector is under pressure to fall, and the sector's own 1.5°C-aligned target requires it to reach 0.489 Gt by 2030 — roughly half of today, against a business-as-usual projection of 1.2 Gt. Accuracy does not make the problem go away. It just means the argument survives contact with someone who checks.

Microplastics: every wash sheds something

Synthetic fabrics — polyester, nylon, acrylic — shed plastic microfibres every time they are washed. Around half a million tonnes of those fibres reach the ocean each year, roughly sixteen times more plastic than came from the microbeads that were banned from cosmetics.

On what share of ocean microplastics comes from textiles, we print UNEP's figure: 9%. You will more often see 35%, which comes from a different study measuring a much narrower category — primary microplastics only — and is routinely quoted without that caveat. We are not printing 35% without the scope attached.

How wanting gets manufactured — measured here, not quoted from abroad

The engine of fast fashion is not the factory. It is the feeling that you will miss something. Countdown timers, “only 2 left”, a price that appears to be collapsing in front of you, an influencer's haul arriving in your feed for the fourth time this week — all of it exists to convert browsing into buying before the wanting wears off.

These tactics have formal names. The US Federal Trade Commission's 2022 staff report on dark patterns catalogues them, and the vocabulary is worth knowing because naming a thing makes it visible: a baseless countdown timer (“a fake countdown clock that just goes away or resets when it times out”), a false low-stock message (“Only 1 left in stock” when inventory is fine), a false activity message (“24 other people are viewing this listing”), and false discount claims. Its governing principle is the useful part: a business is answerable for “the net impression conveyed by the various design elements of their websites, not just the veracity of certain words in isolation.”

To be precise, because precision is the point of this page: that is a staff report describing tactics, not a set of court rulings. No FTC case has charged fake urgency as a standalone violation — it appears in complaints as the deceptive context around other charges. And none of it binds Pakistani retailers. We cite it as the clearest published description of the mechanics, not as law that applies here.

A company has now admitted in court that this is illegal

The strongest evidence is no longer a report. On 22 May 2026 a High Court order in the United Kingdom recorded that the mattress retailer Emma Sleep had broken consumer law by using misleading countdown timers, false “high demand” messages and false discount claims. The company admitted it. The undertakings are court-enforceable, and breaching them is contempt. In the regulator's words: “using fake countdown clocks or misleading ‘discounts’ to push people into spending is illegal.”

In the UK this is now automatic. Since 6 April 2025, falsely stating that a product is available only for a limited time in order to force an immediate decision is unfair in all circumstances under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act — one of 32 practices banned outright, with penalties reaching 10% of global turnover.

When regulators checked the discounts

This is not rare, and it has been counted. In March 2026 the European Commission and consumer authorities across 25 countries checked 314 online traders during the Black Friday period. 30% displayed discounts incorrectly. 18% used pressure-selling techniques — claiming a product was running out, or running countdown timers — and more than half of those were misleading. An earlier sweep of 399 shops found dark patterns on 148 of them, with 42 running fake countdown timers.

We are not alone in measuring this. In July 2025 France's consumer-protection authority fined Shein's European operating company €40 million for deceptive practices, and published what it found when it examined the advertised price reductions:

  • 57% of the advertised offers gave no reduction at all
  • 19% gave a smaller reduction than advertised
  • 11% involved a price that had actually gone up

That is the same mechanic our own anchor filter catches in this market — except confirmed by a state regulator with investigative powers rather than inferred from outside. Other findings followed. In May 2025 the European Commission and four national authorities set out six practices they wanted changed, naming fake discounts and “pressure selling — tactics like false purchase deadlines.” In July 2025 Italy's competition authority issued a €1 million greenwashing penalty, noting emissions pledges were “contradicted by an actual increase” in emissions in 2023 and 2024. In September 2025 France's data-protection regulator added €150 million over cookies placed without consent. In June 2026 the French consumer authority returned with a further €22.5 million. And in February 2026 the Commission opened a formal Digital Services Act investigation covering, among other things, addictive design — specifically, giving users points and rewards for engagement.

Three precisions most coverage drops. These penalties fall on different corporate entities — Infinite Style E-Commerce Ltd and Infinite Styles Services Ltd, Irish companies operating different parts of the European business — not on a single company and not on the parent group. The DSA case is an open proceeding, not a finding; no decision or fine has been issued. And France never banned Shein: the government opened a suspension procedure in November 2025, Shein deactivated its own French marketplace, and the courts rejected the State's suspension request twice — in December 2025 and again on appeal in March 2026.

The first law written specifically against this model

On 8 July 2026 France enacted a law aimed squarely at ultra-fast fashion. It defines the category by two tests applied together — a high number of new product references placed on the market, and weak incentive to repair — and attaches three consequences: a per-item environmental penalty rising from €0.25–€12 in 2026 to €2–€20 by 2030 (capped at half the pre-tax price), a ban on advertising for such products and brands, and a ban on influencer promotion, carrying fines up to €100,000.

But: the advertising and influencer bans do not take effect until 1 January 2027, and the numerical thresholds deciding who counts as ultra-fast fashion are deliberately left out of the statute — they await an implementing decree that had not been published when we checked. No company has yet been designated, and no per-item charge is being levied. Anyone telling you Shein is currently taxed per garment in France is describing something that has not started.

Still, the direction is the point. It is the first statute anywhere to treat the rate at which new products are introduced as the regulated harm — not the fabric, not the emissions, but the pace. That is a legislature agreeing with what this page's data suggests: the volume is the mechanism.

What the ultra-fast model actually does differently

The one hard number worth having is about order size, and it is company-confirmed. Zara typically asks a manufacturer for a minimum of 2,000 items in 30 days. Shein asks for as few as 100 items in as little as 10 days, starting with batches of a few dozen pieces and reordering only what sells. Across roughly 6,000 contract factories, mostly in Guangzhou's Panyu district, that turns a supply chain into a testing machine.

On listing volume, the best-sourced figure is 2,000 to 10,000 SKUs added per day, collected by Rest of World over July–December 2021. Treat it carefully: it is five years old, the collection method was never published, and Shein has since opened to third-party sellers, so newer counts are not comparable. The upper bound is also routinely quoted alone — “10,000 a day” — when the finding was a range.

A peer-reviewed study complicates the picture in a way almost nobody reports. Analysing 12,000 items sold by Shein, Zara and H&M in the US between January 2022 and December 2023, Lu and Mullen found Shein ran a narrower assortment and a significantly lower product replenishment rate than Zara and H&M — the opposite of the usual framing. What distinguished it was concentration on trend items over staples. The model is not simply “more of everything.” It is a bet placed on many small guesses, most of which are never repeated.

We are not going to tell you what Shein or Zara do internally, because we cannot see inside them and this page does not print things it cannot source. What we can do is something no one else in this market can: measure the mechanic where it happens to Pakistani shoppers, using hourly price history across 22 brands.

What our own price history shows

  • Inflated “was” prices are real and measurable. Of the discount claims live across the market, we routinely discard around 5% as implausible — anchors more than three times the selling price. A discount computed from a price nothing ever sold at is not a discount. It is a design choice.
  • The deepest advertised discounts cluster in the cheapest tiers. Items between Rs 1,000 and Rs 2,499 carry the largest average cuts — deeper than items above Rs 5,000. Urgency is aimed hardest at the buyers with the least room to absorb a mistake.
  • “Last chance” is usually not. Tracking the post-Azadi window, the number of discounted items fell while the average discount rose — the shallow cuts ended and the genuine clearance deepened. The urgent-looking sale and the actually-cheap moment were two different weeks.

That last point is the practical defence, and it costs nothing: a price is a record, not an announcement. If you can see what an item cost last month, a banner cannot tell you it is a bargain. That is the entire reason this site tracks prices hourly and publishes the drops.

Water: the right number, and the right verb

A 250-gram cotton T-shirt has a global-average water footprint of 2,720 litres. The figure is real and traceable to peer-reviewed work from 2006. What is almost always wrong is the verb attached to it.

2,720 litres, broken down — one 250 g cotton T-shirt

1,230 L blue — surface and groundwater actually abstracted for irrigation. 1,110 L green — rainfall the crop transpired, which would otherwise have fed other vegetation. 380 L grey — a theoretical volume needed to dilute pollution to safe levels; no such water is withdrawn.

So “2,700 litres of water are used to make a T-shirt” overstates abstraction by more than double. The honest sentence is: a water footprint of about 2,700 litres, of which roughly 1,200 litres is actual freshwater abstraction.

The authors themselves said as much — that blue water matters more than green, and that their dilution figures are overestimates wherever effluent is treated. But do not over-correct into the opposite myth, which is also wrong: cotton is unusually irrigation-hungry. Blue water is its largest single component, and among major crops only date palm depends less on rainfall. This matters directly here, because Pakistan is specifically identified in that research as a place where cotton's footprint is dominantly blue water — irrigation, from the Indus.

For jeans, the number you have seen — 7,500 litres — is an orphan. Its only traceable appearance is an uncited line in a 2019 UN press release, which contradicts itself in its own factbox. The peer-reviewed figure is 10,850 litres for a one-kilogram pair, and Levi Strauss's own ISO-conformant lifecycle assessment of a pair of 501s gives 3,781 litres consumed cradle-to-grave. Those two are not in conflict — they measure different things — but neither is 7,500.

The Levi's study contains the most useful fact on this page for anyone reading at home: 23% of that water is consumer care — your washing machine, not the factory. Washing a pair every ten wears instead of every wear cut water use by 77%.

One more claim to dispose of. You will read that textile dyeing causes about 20% of the world's industrial water pollution, attributed to the World Bank. We traced it: the citation chain ends in a single uncited sentence in a 2012 journal article, and the World Bank has confirmed it has no report saying this. The figure also appears to have lost a geographic qualifier along the way, and closely resembles a genuine but different statistic — that dyeing accounts for 15–20% of a textile mill's own wastewater flow. That is a fact about a factory, not about the planet.

Pakistan's own water bill

Agriculture takes 94% of Pakistan's water withdrawals — about 136 billion cubic metres a year, net. Cotton occupies 14% of the country's cropped area, and the World Bank is direct about the cost: cotton has the highest blue water footprint of any major Pakistani crop, roughly double the global average per tonne, at about half the global average water productivity. Cotton and rice together account for “well over half” of all irrigation water used in Pakistan.

You will see cotton's share of Pakistan's water quoted as 20%, 25% or a third. We checked: no authoritative source publishes a cotton-only figure. The World Bank deliberately gives the cotton-and-rice combined number instead. Splitting it would be invention, so we do not.

The more important distinction is one almost no coverage makes. Growing cotton consumes water. Turning yarn into cloth mostly pollutes it. In the World Bank's words, wet processing and finishing “consumes a small volume of blue water, but has a large grey water footprint” — and between a third and a half of the entire water footprint of producing cotton textiles is that pollution-dilution burden from processing yarn. The dyeing house is not drinking the river. It is spending it.

The number that should be the headline

The World Bank estimates that roughly 1% of Pakistan's industrial wastewater is treated before discharge, that about one industry in six is heavily polluting — with textiles and leather the worst — and that the chemical oxygen demand of Pakistani rivers exceeds the national standard, in some cases by more than 500%.

There is measured local evidence too. Groundwater sampled around the Khurrianwala industrial zone in Faisalabad — some 200 textile units discharging to the Madhuana drain — showed chromium at 0.12–0.94 mg/L and dissolved solids of 987–2,114 mg/L, with 36% of samples outside drinking-water limits. That is a peer-reviewed study, sampled in 2016.

Two things we will not do with this. We will not present Kasur or Korangi chromium data as textile pollution — Kasur is a leather-tanning cluster and Korangi is a mixed estate whose chromium literature is tannery chemistry, a completely different process. And the strongest recent Faisalabad study found carcinogenic risk for those metals within acceptable range, so “textiles are poisoning Pakistan's drinking water” overstates what the evidence supports.

The rivers, and the pattern nobody reports

The famous polluted rivers are real. Bangladesh's Buriganga has been measured with dissolved oxygen near zero and biological oxygen demand of 75–174 mg/L. Indonesia's Citarum carries a heavy-metal pollution index in the critical band at every point tested. India's Noyyal was carrying 87 million litres a day of effluent from 729 dyeing units, at three to seven times the legal dissolved-solids limit.

But the story usually told — polluted river, outraged public, nothing done — is wrong, and the truth is bleaker. A great deal was done. Indonesia's president signed a dedicated Citarum regulation in 2018 and put the military on it. India's Madras High Court ordered every Tirupur dyeing unit to achieve zero liquid discharge and, when they didn't, ordered them all closed and their power cut in January 2011 — the first court anywhere to specify ZLD engineering. Bangladesh's High Court has run a continuing order on industrial pollution since 1994 and forcibly relocated 155 tanneries.

And then: Tirupur's Orathupalayam dam was still at 3,200 mg/L dissolved solids in 2016, against a 2,100 limit. Bangladesh's own government evaluation, published in 2026, found the relocated tanneries' treatment plant discharging at COD 737 mg/L against a limit of 200. The Asian Development Bank's Citarum programme delivered $50 million of a $504 million facility and was rated less than successful. In Tirupur, researchers found the better treatment plants deliberately slowing down to match the worst ones, because investing in compliance had made them uncompetitive.

That is the finding worth carrying away, and it applies directly to Pakistan: the binding constraint has not been law, or even money. It is that in every one of these places, nobody was measuring the outcome — no baseline before, no series after. The Tirupur researchers say so explicitly. Chile's government says it has no inventory of its own dumps. And Pakistan takes in a million tonnes of the world's used clothing a year with no published account of where it goes.

The quiet change: we buy more and wear it less

Between 2000 and 2014, clothing production doubled, the number of garments bought per person rose about 60%, and people kept clothes roughly half as long. Over fifteen years, the average number of times a garment is worn before it stops being used fell by 36% — in China by 70%. The average American bought 69 garments in 2021, against 40 in the 1990s.

Notice what this does not say. It does not say a garment is worn seven times — that number comes from a British charity's consumer survey and has been repeated until it sounds like physics. The measured change is in utilisation, and it is large enough without embellishment.

So are Pakistani brands fast fashion? The data says no.

This is the question our own data can answer, and the answer is more interesting than either side of the usual argument.

812

New listings per day, all 22 brands combined

392

Per day excluding the Laam marketplace

72%

Of items with a detected fabric, natural fibre

22,696

Unstitched items — cloth that goes to a tailor

Across all 22 tracked brands put together, roughly 812 new items are listed per day — and setting aside Laam, a marketplace carrying hundreds of independent designers, the 21 conventional brands add about 392 a day between them. Ultra-fast-fashion platforms are reported to add thousands daily on their own. Whatever else Pakistani retail is, it is not operating at that tempo.

The fabric mix points the same way. Where our detection identifies a fabric — 56,389 in-stock items, about 32% of the catalogue — 72% are natural-fibre families (cotton, lawn, cambric, khaddar, linen, silk, wool, denim) against 27% synthetic or blended (chiffon, organza, net, velvet, satin, viscose, fleece, jacquard). Lawn and cotton dominating a wardrobe is a climate adaptation, not an environmental policy — but it does mean less plastic in the wash water.

And then the category that has no equivalent in fast fashion at all: 22,696 unstitched items in stock right now. Unstitched cloth goes to a tailor, is cut to one person's measurements, and can be altered, let out, taken in and re-cut for years. It is a made-to-measure, repairable garment sold at mass-market prices — the thing sustainable-fashion writing in the West keeps proposing as the future, already normal here.

The honest caveat

None of this makes Pakistani fashion clean. Our data covers what brands list — not how their fabric was dyed, how much water the cotton drank, what their suppliers pay, or where unsold stock ends up. A slower catalogue is a smaller footprint per season, not a small footprint. What the numbers rule out is only the specific accusation that Pakistani brands run an ultra-fast-fashion model. They do not.

What actually changes anything

The single most effective thing anyone can do with a garment is wear it more times. Every impact figure on this page is divided by the number of wears. A shirt worn a hundred times has a hundredth of the per-wear footprint of the same shirt worn once, and no fabric choice, certification or recycling scheme comes close to that ratio.

  • Buy for the wear count, not the price. A Rs 4,000 kameez worn forty times costs Rs 100 a wear. A Rs 700 one worn three times costs Rs 233. The cheap option was the expensive one.
  • Use the tailor. Altering, letting out and re-cutting is the most established circular-fashion system in the country, and it is already at the end of your street.
  • Wash less often. The most underrated item here. In Levi's own lifecycle study, 23% of a pair of jeans' total water use was consumer care — and washing every ten wears instead of every wear cut water use by 77%. Microfibre shedding also happens in the machine: chiffon, organza and net shed plastic; cotton, lawn and khaddar do not.
  • Treat the discount as information, not a reason. A price that keeps falling is telling you the item did not sell — which is worth knowing, and is not the same as needing it.
  • Buy at the end of a season, not the start of a campaign. Clearance moves stock that already exists. Launch-week buying signals demand for stock that has not been made yet.

What we deliberately do not do here is tell anyone to buy less when the cheapest tier of this market is what makes clothing reachable for millions of people. The waste problem in fashion was not created by families shopping carefully at Rs 700. It was created by a model that treats clothing as disposable — and that model is not headquartered here.

Numbers we refuse to print

Researching this page meant checking the statistics everyone repeats. Most did not survive. We list them because a reader who has seen them elsewhere deserves to know why they are missing here — and because a page that quietly drops a famous number looks like it forgot.

“Fashion produces 10% of global carbon emissions.”

No study produces this number. UNEP's own footnote names the three studies behind its 2–8% range — they give 2%, 4% and 8%. The most recent bottom-up estimate, from the Apparel Impact Institute in July 2025, is 0.944 billion tonnes CO₂e for 2023, about 1.8% of global emissions.

“Fashion is the second most polluting industry after oil.”

Traced in 2017 to no study, no data, and the institute it was attributed to disavowing it. It has been debunked repeatedly and is still printed constantly.

“39,000 tonnes of clothing are dumped in the Atacama every year.”

Cannot be traced to any measurement. Chile's own government states it has no inventory of illegal textile dumps and no concrete figure. Estimates of the whole pile — not an annual flow — range from 11,000 to 59,000 tonnes, a spread that concedes nobody weighed it.

“2,700 litres of water to make one cotton T-shirt.”

The number is real (2,720 L) but the verb is wrong. Only about 1,230 L is actual freshwater abstraction; 1,110 L is rainfall the crop would have transpired anyway, and 380 L is a theoretical dilution volume that is never withdrawn.

“7,500 litres of water to make a pair of jeans.”

An orphan. Its only traceable appearance is an uncited line in a 2019 UN press release, which contradicts itself in its own factbox. The peer-reviewed figure is 10,850 litres for a 1 kg pair; Levi's own ISO-conformant lifecycle assessment gives 3,781 litres. Neither is 7,500.

“Textile dyeing causes 20% of global industrial water pollution.”

Attributed everywhere to the World Bank. The World Bank has confirmed it has no report saying this. The chain ends at one uncited sentence in a 2012 journal article, and the figure closely resembles a real but different statistic — that dyeing is 15–20% of a single mill's own wastewater flow.

“Shein adds 10,000 new items every day.”

That is the top of a range — the sourced finding was 2,000 to 10,000 SKUs per day, measured over July–December 2021 with no published methodology. It is five years old, and Shein has since opened to third-party sellers, so newer counts are not comparable.

“A garment is worn only 7 times before it is thrown away.”

Traces to a 2015 press release from a British children's charity, based on a survey of around 2,000 UK women. McKinsey's version says “some estimates suggest” — a hedge that citers delete. It is not a global measurement, and certainly not a Pakistani one.

“A garbage truck of textiles is landfilled every second.”

Not an observation. It is a unit conversion — the underlying tonnage divided by an assumed bale density and truck volume — presented as if someone counted trucks.

“100 billion garments are made every year.”

Traces to a figure for 2014. Competing estimates span 80–150 billion, and 88% of the 250 largest brands do not disclose their production volumes at all, so nobody can verify it.

Sources

Every global figure on this page comes from one of the following, each linked to the primary document rather than a summary of it. Pakistani figures come from TrendCompare's own tracker — see our methodology for how they are collected and what they exclude.

  1. Ellen MacArthur Foundation, “A New Textiles Economy” (2017) — data year 2015
  2. Textile Exchange, Materials Market Report 2025 — data year 2024
  3. European Environment Agency, “Circularity of the EU textiles value chain in numbers” (26 March 2025)
  4. European Environment Agency, “Europe's used textiles are an increasing waste and export problem” (27 February 2023)
  5. Apparel Impact Institute, “Taking Stock of Progress Against the Roadmap to Net Zero” (July 2025) — data year 2023
  6. Grist / El País, “Burn after wearing” (4 January 2024) — investigation into the Atacama dumps
  7. McKinsey, “Style that's sustainable” (20 October 2016) — data years 2000–2014
  8. Good On You, “The trouble with clothing production volume figures” (15 July 2024)
  9. Alden Wicker, Racked (15 March 2017) — debunking “fashion is the second most polluting industry”
  10. World Bank WITS / UN Comtrade — Pakistan used-clothing imports (HS 630900), calendar year 2024
  11. Dawn, citing Pakistan Bureau of Statistics — textile exports FY2025-26 (16 July 2026)
  12. The Friday Times, “White gold tarnished” — Pakistani cotton against the 2004-05 peak (11 July 2026)
  13. Dawn — projected Pakistani cotton imports against domestic production (23 May 2026)
  14. International Accord for Health and Safety in the Textile and Garment Industry — Pakistan programme, as of 30 June 2026
  15. Dawn, “SC acquits two men in Baldia factory fire case” (10 June 2026)
  16. ECCHR, case report on the Ali Enterprises fire and its SA8000 certification — Baldia Town, Karachi
  17. ILO, “Compensation arrangement agreed for victims of Ali Enterprises factory fire” (10 September 2016)
  18. Asia Floor Wage Alliance — living wage benchmarks (2024)
  19. Clean Clothes Campaign — what share of a garment's price reaches the worker
  20. US Federal Trade Commission, “Bringing Dark Patterns to Light” — staff report, September 2022 (taxonomy, pp. 21–22)
  21. UK Competition and Markets Authority — High Court order of 22 May 2026: Emma Sleep admitted misleading countdown timers, false “high demand” messages and false discount claims broke consumer law
  22. Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (UK), Schedule 20 para 7 — false limited-time claims unfair in all circumstances, in force 6 April 2025
  23. European Commission, IP/26/734 — Black Friday pricing sweep of 314 traders across 25 countries (26 March 2026)
  24. France 24, reporting the DGCCRF's €40m penalty and its audit of advertised discounts (3 July 2025)
  25. European Commission, IP/25/1331 — CPC Network consumer-protection action (26 May 2025)
  26. AGCM (Italy), decision PS12709 — €1m greenwashing penalty (adopted 29 July 2025)
  27. CNIL (France), €150m penalty over cookies placed without consent, SAN-2025-005 (1 September 2025)
  28. European Commission, IP/26/420 — Digital Services Act proceedings opened (17 February 2026)
  29. Loi n° 2026-602 du 8 juillet 2026 (France) — advertising and influencer bans effective 1 January 2027
  30. Rest of World, “How Shein beat Amazon and reinvented fast fashion” (14 December 2021) — SKU counts, Jul–Dec 2021
  31. Lu & Mullen, Research Journal of Textile and Apparel 29(4):790–803 (29 July 2024) — 12,000 items, US market
  32. Chapagain, Hoekstra, Savenije & Gautam, “The water footprint of cotton consumption,” Ecological Economics 60(1) (2006) — Table 9
  33. Levi Strauss & Co., lifecycle assessment of a pair of 501s (March 2015) — ISO 14040/14044 conformant
  34. New Standard Institute — tracing the “20% of industrial water pollution” claim to its dead end
  35. World Bank, “Pakistan: Getting More from Water” (report 133964, January 2019)
  36. Aleem et al., groundwater quality near the Khurrianwala industrial zone, Water 10(10):1321 (2018) — sampled 2016
  37. Grönwall & Jonsson, zero liquid discharge in Tirupur, Water Alternatives 10(2):602–624 (2017)
  38. IMED (Bangladesh) evaluation of the Savar tannery CETP, reported July 2026 — outlet COD 737 mg/L vs a 200 limit
  39. Wardhani et al., heavy metals in the Citarum, Jurnal Presipitasi 21(3):812–824 (2024) — sampled late 2022

Free to cite

Journalists and researchers may quote any figure here with attribution. Pakistani figures change hourly, so please include the date. For a custom cut of the data, email [email protected].